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Abstract 
This study advances, and experimentally tests, a new explanation for the disparity 
between willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA)—a dynamic 
neoclassical theory based on the presence of commitment costs. While to date 
neoclassical models have not explained the observed data patterns well, we find that the 
commitment cost theory is able to explain adequately the causes and severity of the 
WTP/WTA value disparity. In particular, using data gathered from an actual marketplace, 
even the most stringent of our theoretical conjectures—cases where WTP values are 
predicted to exceed WTA values—oftentimes are met.  
 
Keywords:  field experiment, neoclassical theory, willingness to accept, willingness to 
pay, WTP/WTA disparity. 
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THE WTP/WTA DISPARITY: HAVE WE BEEN OBSERVING  
DYNAMIC VALUES BUT INTERPRETING THEM AS STATIC? 
A fundamental tenet in neoclassical theory is the basic independence assumption: an 
individual’s preferences are assumed to be measured over levels, not over changes. While 
most theoretical and applied economic models invoke this assumption, a wealth of data 
refutes this premise, as systemic empirical disparities have been observed between 
willingness to pay (WTP) and the compensation demanded, or willingness to accept 
(WTA), for the same good (e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990). In an influential 
line of work, Hanemann (1991) shows that the large WTP/WTA disparities that have 
been observed in the literature can be reconciled with static neoclassical theory via 
income and substitution effects, but the empirical evidence to date has not conformed 
well to Hanemann’s (1991), or any other, neoclassical-based model.1 If the disparity is 
inconsistent with neoclassical explanations, then there are profound implications from 
both a positive and normative perspective: a lack of stationarity in preferences as implied 
by endowment effects suggests that much of neoclassical theory is in need of revision.  
In this paper, we provide a different explanation for the WTP/WTA disparity—a dy-
namic neoclassical theory based on the presence of commitment costs. Our theory 
predicts that if agents are uncertain about the net payoff of a selling or purchasing trans-
action, and if they can obtain more information in the future, they will demand 
compensation to trade now (thereby giving up the option to trade at a later time with 
more information). WTP equals the good’s intrinsic value minus its associated compensa-
tion, and WTA equals intrinsic value plus its compensation. Thus, the divergence can 
arise when the compensation, called commitment costs, exists and is consistent with 
stable preferences and optimizing behavior on the part of agents. The disparity therefore 
can be a logical outcome of optimizing behavior in a dynamic and stochastic setting.  
If commitment costs are the primary sources of the disparity, then the basket of tools 
associated with Hicksian welfare measurement can be fundamentally preserved, albeit 
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with additional care given to the presence and interpretation of commitment costs and 
their welfare effects. We explore the predictive power of our theory by examining WTP 
and WTA statements of value from consumers behaving in a competitive marketplace: 
the sportscard market. The sportscard marketplace is a natural setting for an examination 
of preference structures, as it provides a rich pool of subjects making decisions in a 
familiar environment, with uncertainty and future information about the values of the 
traded good. 
The empirical results are sharp. First, our data suggest that a disparity exists, even for 
those consumers who plan to purchase the good for resale. Second, we find that the 
comparative static predictions of the commitment cost theory perform quite well: WTP 
(WTA) increases (decreases) in the difficulty of delay and decreases (increases) in the 
difficulty of reversing the transaction. Further, the observed WTP/WTA divergence can, 
in part, be attributable to the asymmetries in the perceived reversal and delay difficulties 
between the buyers and sellers. We believe that this study is the first to document that a 
neoclassical-based theory can explain the causes and severity of the value disparity.  
 
Theoretical Background 
Zhao and Kling (2001) presented an explicitly dynamic theory of the formation of 
WTP and WTA and commitment costs under uncertainty and future learning. In this 
section, we extend that model to the important setting of actual market experiments. We 
show the conditions needed for commitment costs to arise and use these conditions to 
design tests for the presence of commitment costs. 
Consider a situation in which subjects formulate their WTP or WTA facing a trading 
opportunity in an experiment, knowing that the same good (or a reasonable substitute) 
can be traded outside in a “regular” market. Let [ , ]l hv v v∈  be their own (uncertain) 
valuation of the good (hereafter “sportscard” or “card”), and let [ , ]l hR R R∈  be their 
information about the market price of the card. That is, they do not know v  or R  with 
certainty but know their distributions. For simplicity, we assume that they can learn both 
v and R with certainty later (i.e., after the experiment).2 
Now, consider an experiment in which subjects can purchase the cards. If the sub-
jects decide to purchase the card in the experiment but later (after learning v and R) 
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decide the card is not worth keeping, they can sell it at the realized market price, R . 
However, doing so incurs a transaction cost rpc , where subscript p denotes WTP, and 
superscript r denotes “reversing the trade.” In contrast, if they decide not to buy the card 
in the experiment, they can purchase it later in the regular market, paying the market 
price R while incurring a transaction cost dpc , where the superscript d denotes “delay.” In 
experiments where subjects can sell the cards, let rAc  and dAc  be the transaction costs of 
reversing the transaction (or buying the card back in the regular market) and delaying the 
decision (or selling the card later in the market). 
 
Formulation of WTP and WTA 
Subjects’ WTP is defined as the maximum price they are willing to pay to buy the 
card in the experiment, knowing that they can later learn about their valuation v and the 
market price R. Suppose they buy at price P; if after the experiment the subjects’ realized 
value of the card v is lower than rPR c− , they can sell the card and realize the gain of 
r
PR c v− − . Thus their expected payoff of buying at price p in the experiment is 
 1 ( ) ( )r
P
r
Pv R cU E v E R c v p< −= + − − − , (1) 
where the second expectation is taken over both v and R in the region rPv R c< −  and 
represents the option value of reversing the purchasing transaction. To facilitate discus-
sion, we denote this option value by rPO , or 
 ( )r
P
r r
P Pv R cO E R c v< −= − − . (2) 
If subjects delay or decline to purchase at price p, they still have the option of buying 
the card later. They will then gain v but will pay the market price R plus the transaction 
cost dPc . Thus their expected payoff is 
 2 ( )d
P
d d
P Pv R cU O E v R c> += ≡ − − , (3) 
4 / Kling, List, and Zhao 
where the expectation again is taken over the region dPv R c> + , and dPO  denotes the 
option value of buying the card later. 
Subjects’ WTP is the unique p that equates 1U  and 2U . Hence, 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).r d
P P
d r r d
P P P Pv R c v R cWTP E v O O E v E R c v E v R c< − > += − − = + − − − − −  (4) 
The term d rp pO O−  is the commitment cost, representing the net loss of option values in 
committing to the purchase now. Notice that WTP can be higher or lower than E(v), the 
expected value of the card, depending on the value of the two options and thus the sign of 
the commitment cost. If agents expect that the cost of reversing rPc  is high but the cost of 
delaying dPc  is low, then rPO  is low and dPO  is high, yielding ( )WTP E v< . If r dP Pc c= , and 
the random value R – v (the negative of the consumer surplus) is symmetric around zero, 
then we expect the two option values to be equivalent, and ( )WTP E v= . Equation (4) 
also suggests that WTP should be increasing in the cost of delay dpc  but decreasing in the 
cost of reversal rpc . 
The formation of WTA follows similar logic: subjects’ WTA is defined as the mini-
mum price subjects are willing to accept to give up the card in the experiment. Suppose 
subjects sell the card at price P. They still have the option of buying the card back in the 
regular market (i.e., reversing their trade) at the market price R plus the transaction cost 
r
Ac , the value of which is denoted as rAO . Thus, their expected payoff is 
 1 ( ) ( ) ( )r
A
r r
A Av R cP O E v P E v R c E vπ > += + − = + − − − . (5) 
If they do not sell the card during the experiment, they retain the opportunity to sell 
at the market price, incurring transaction cost dAc . Thus, their expected payoff is 
 2 ( )d
A
d d
A Av R cO E R c vπ < −= = − − , (6) 
where dAO  denotes the option value of selling the card later.  
Again, equating 1π  and 2π , we obtain WTA as 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )d r
A A
d r d r
A A A Av R c v R cWTA E v O O E v E R c v E v R c< − > += + − = + − − − − − , (7) 
and d rA AO O−  is the associated commitment cost. Similar to WTP, WTA can be below or 
above E(v), depending on the magnitude of dAO  and rAO . If subjects expect that there is a 
small cost of delaying the transaction but a high cost of reversing it, or dAc  is small and 
r
Ac  is high, 
d
AO  is high and rAO  is low, leading to ( ).WTA E v>  Further, WTA is increas-
ing in the cost of reversal rAc  but decreasing in the cost of delay dAc . 
WTP/WTA Divergence 
From (4) and (7), we know that 
 ( ) ( )d r d rA A P PWTA WTP O O O O− = − + − . (8) 
Therefore, the divergence between WTP and WTA equals the sum of the two commitment 
costs. Further, WTA > WTP if at least one of the commitment costs is (sufficiently) 
positive. If subjects believe that reversing a transaction is more costly than conducting the 
transaction, regardless of whether they are thinking about buying or selling, we would 
expect d rA AO O>  and d rP PO O> , and thus WTA > WTP. Notice, however, that reversing the 
selling decision is similar to delaying the buying decision: both involve buying the card 
later. In this case, we may have r dA Pc c= . Similarly, reversing the purchasing decision is 
similar to delaying the selling decision: both involve selling the card on the regular market. 
Then, we may have r dP Ac c= . In this case, 
d r
A PO O=  and d rP AO O= , and thus WTP = WTA. 
 
Experiment Design and Hypotheses 
Our objectives in designing the field experiment were twofold: (i) to investigate 
whether subjects behave dynamically in forming their WTP and/or WTA values; that is, 
whether they take potential opportunities for delay or reversal into account when forming 
their bids or offers; and (ii) to examine whether conditions exist such that the dynamic 
formulation can explain the WTP/WTA divergence. Two distinct field experiments were 
undertaken to explore these issues. The first experiment uses data on subjects’ perception 
of how difficult it would be to delay or reverse the proposed transactions. The second 
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experiment exogenously varies the degree of delay and reversal difficulties associated 
with the formation of WTA.  
Field Experiment I: Perceptions Treatments 
The first set of field treatments was carried out on the floor of a sportscard show in a 
large eastern city. In both treatments (WTP and WTA), the experience of the subjects 
typically followed four steps: (i) inspection of the card and learning the auction rules, (ii) 
actual bid (offer), (iii) survey completion, and (iv) debriefing. In step 1 of the WTP 
treatment, potential subjects approached the experimenter’s table and inquired about the 
sale of the baseball card displayed on the table. For both treatment types, we chose a Cal 
Ripken, Jr. 1983 Topps baseball card, which has a book value of approximately $12. 
Both treatments displayed the same sportscard to all bidders—a Cal Ripken, Jr. PSA 
graded as “PSA 8 near mint/mint” baseball card. This particular choice of a good was 
appropriate as we conjectured that there would be a mix of subjects in this pool that 
would opt to sell or trade the card if they left the experiment with the card.  
The experimenter then invited potential subjects to take about five minutes to par-
ticipate in an auction. If the subjects agreed, in step 2 the monitor explained the rules of 
the random nth-price auction. As described in List and Shogren (1998), the random nth-
price auction can be characterized by four simple steps: (i) each bidder submits a bid 
(offer); (ii) each bid (offer) is rank-ordered from lowest to highest; (iii) the monitor 
selects a random number (n) uniformly distributed between 2 and Z (Z bidders); and (iv) 
in the WTP case, the monitor sells one unit of the good to each of the (n – 1) highest 
bidders at the nth-price. In the WTA case, the monitor buys one unit each from the (n – 1) 
lowest bidders and pays the nth-lowest bid. The monitor informed participants that their 
bids would not be opened until after the show and that all bids would be destroyed when 
the research project was completed. In the WTA treatment, after physically giving 
subjects the card, the subjects made their offer.3  
In step 3, the monitor asked the subjects to complete a confidential survey that would 
be used for “statistical purposes only.” The survey, which is contained in the Appendix, 
was used to obtain important information about what subjects planned to do with the card 
if they won the auction (WTP) or did not sell in the auction (WTA). The choices included 
“keep,” “trade,” or “sell.” The survey also obtained information about subjects’ percep-
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tions of such things as ease of trade or sale or ease of purchase. In the fourth stage of the 
experiment, the monitor explained to participants that they would be contacted within 
three days after the show if they were among the n – 1 highest (lowest) bidders (offerers). 
Subject were further informed that winners would receive the sheet after they had sent a 
check or money order for the amount of the nth highest bid. The random n chosen was 24 
for the WTP treatment and 30 for the WTA treatment. Within three days, the winners of 
each auction were notified by phone or e-mail, and when the monitor received the check 
(card), he mailed out the card (check). 
Field Experiment II: Exogenous Treatments 
The second set of field treatments was also carried out on the floor of a sportscard 
show in a large eastern city. The same basic procedures were followed as described for 
the first set of treatments, with several key differences. First, instead of using a 
sportscard, we used an unopened pack of sportscards as the good. The pack of sportscards 
had a retail value of approximately $3 and had been introduced recently to the market, 
providing a sense of value uncertainty. Second, only WTA values were elicited and there 
were three distinct treatments, which differed by the degree to which the monitor offered to 
make reversal or delay of the transaction easier for subjects. The first treatment serves as a 
control and links these results to the perceptions treatments in that subjects simply were 
given the pack of sportscards and were asked to state their minimum WTA in an auction. 
In the second treatment, subjects were informed that if they sold their pack at the 
auction, they would be allowed to return the following week and repurchase the pack 
from the monitor at the selling price (or upon receipt of payment the monitor would mail 
the pack, postage paid). We denote this treatment as the “goods-back-guarantee” (GBG) 
treatment; it is designed to reduce the cost to the subject of reversing a transaction, should 
the subject wish to do so.  
In the third treatment, subjects were informed that if they did not sell their pack at 
the auction, they could return the following week and use space on the monitor’s dealer 
table to attempt to sell the pack. We term this treatment the “table” treatment; it is 
designed to reduce the cost to the subject of delaying the transaction.  
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Hypotheses 
With these field data, we are able to test two types of hypotheses. First, we examine 
whether subjects form their WTP and WTA values dynamically: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: WTP (WTA) increases (decreases) in the delay difficulty dPc  ( dAc ) and 
decreases (increases) in the reversal difficulty rPc  ( rAc ). 
 
In the first field experiment, we test this hypothesis in terms of the perceived delay and 
reversal difficulties. In the second field experiment, we study the effects of both the 
perceived and actual delay and reversal difficulties.  
Second, we test whether the observed WTP/WTA values relate to the delay and re-
versal difficulties:  
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: (i) WTA>WTP if subjects in both WTP and WTA treatments perceive 
that it is more difficult to reverse than to delay the respective transaction: r dP Pc c>  
and r dA Ac c> ; (ii) WTA<WTP if subjects in both treatments perceive that it is easier 
to reverse than to delay the respective transactions: r dP Pc c<  and r dA Ac c< ; (iii) 
WTA=WTP if subjects perceive the same selling (or buying) difficulties across the 
WTP and WTA transactions: r dP Ac c=  and d rP Ac c= . 
 
Here, only the first set of field treatments is relevant, as data on both WTP and WTA are 
necessary, and perceptions of the delay and reversal difficulties are critical to the predic-
tions. Note that even if the respondents behave according to the commitment cost theory, 
WTA is greater than WTP only when the perceived delay and reversal difficulties satisfy 
certain conditions. Otherwise, it is possible that WTA is less than or equal to WTP.  
 
Experiment Results 
Table 1 summarizes the relevant statistics from field experiment I. Column 1 con-
tains summary statistics for the overall sample, while columns 2 and 3 contain 
information for the WTP and WTA subsamples. Data in the first row suggest that the  
The WTP/WTA Disparity: Have We Been Observing Dynamic Values but Interpreting Them as Static? / 9 
TABLE 1. Summary statistics: field experiment I 
Variable Total Sample 
WTP  
Subsample 
WTA  
Subsample 
Bid/offer value 9.69 (90) 
[6.74] 
7.46 (49) 
[4.64] 
12.37 (41) 
[7.35] 
Value for keepers – 7.00 (15) 
[3.89] 
15.39 (18) 
[8.07] 
Value for non-keepers – 7.67 (34) 
[4.97] 
10.00 (23) 
[5.89] 
Years experience 8.42 (90) 
[5.50] 
8.27 (49) 
[6.03] 
8.61 (41) 
[4.87] 
Dealer 0.11 (90) 
[0.32] 
0.14 (49) 
[0.36] 
0.07 (41) 
[0.26] 
Gender 0.90 (90) 
[0.31] 
0.92 (49) 
[0.28] 
0.88 (41) 
[0.33] 
Age 34.61 (90) 
[11.48] 
33.47 (49) 
[11.41] 
35.98 (41) 
[11.56] 
Education 15.18 (90) 
[15.17] 
15.06 (49) 
[3.22] 
15.32 (41) 
[2.55] 
Keep 0.37 (90) 
[0.37] 
0.31 (49) 
[0.47] 
0.44 (41) 
[0.50] 
Delay difficulty 1.68 (72) 
[0.82] 
1.55 (49) 
[0.74] 
1.96 (23) 
[0.92] 
Delay difficulty for 
keepers 
– 1.20 (15) 
[0.41] – 
Delay difficulty for non-
keepers 
– 1.71 (34) 
[0.80] 
1.96 (23) 
[0.93] 
Purchase 2.22 (90) 
[0.91] 
1.92 (49) 
[0.99] 
2.59 (41) 
[0.63] 
Reversal difficulty 1.95 (75) 
[1.01] 
2.41 (34)  
[1.10] 
1.56 (41)  
[0.74] 
Reversal difficulty for 
keepers 
– 
– 
1.56 (18) 
[0.86] 
Reversal difficulty for 
non-keepers 
– 2.41(34) 
[1.10] 
1.57 (23) 
[0.66] 
    
Income 53,765 (83) 
[26,154] 
55,640 (43) 
[22,827] 
51,750 (40) 
[23,137] 
Outcome 2.26 (41) 
[2.27] 
2.27 (49) 
[0.95] 
na 
Market value 12.69 (81) 
[7.20] 
14.46 (45) 
[7.56] 
10.47 (36) 
[6.13] 
Note: The table presents the sample means of the variables, with the number of sample points in 
parentheses and the standard deviations in square brackets. 
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average WTA ($12.37) is much larger than the average WTP ($7.46), and this differ-
ence is statistically significant.4 Thus, the value divergence commonly found in the 
literature certainly is present in experiment I as well.  
Data presented in rows 2 and 3 push the analysis a level deeper and suggest that 
WTA and WTP subjects who plan to keep the card behave differently from one an-
other; average WTA values ($15.39) are much larger than comparable WTP values 
($7.00), and this difference is statistically significant at conventional levels. Yet even 
for those who plan to trade/sell the card, a nontrivial value disparity exists: WTP = 
$7.67 versus WTA = $10.00. This difference is only statistically significant at the  
p < 0.054 level using a one-sided alternative, however. This result is inconsistent with, 
for example, theories that suggest that indifference curves are unstable across different 
property rights regimes. A key feature of these theories is that value disparities should 
not be present when the individual views the good only as a medium of exchange. As 
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990, p. 1328) note, “there are some cases in which 
no endowment effect would be expected, such as when goods are purchased for resale 
rather than for utilization.”5  
Table 2 summarizes the relevant statistics for experiment II, which was designed 
with treatments that exogenously varied the delay and reversal difficulties in WTA. 
The reversal cost rAc  is reduced in the GBG treatment, and the delay cost dAc  is reduced 
in the table treatment. Subjects’ perceptions of the delay and reversal costs are elicited 
through a survey instrument, as in experiment I. 
Table 2 also contains the mean offer values for “keepers,” who indicated that they 
expected to keep their pack if they did not sell it in the auction, as well as average 
values for “non-keepers,” who intend to sell or trade at a later date if they are unsuc-
cessful in the auction. These average values qualitatively mimic those in Table 1. In all 
cases, keepers report a higher average WTA. Further, they perceive that it is harder to 
reverse the trade and easier to delay selling the pack than do non-keepers. This asym-
metric perception about the ease of delay and reversal is consistent with a higher WTA 
value for keepers, based on the commitment cost theory.  
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TABLE 2. Summary statistics: field experiment II 
Variable Total Sample 
Base  
Subsample 
GBG  
Subsample 
Table  
Subsample 
WTA value 4.10 (112) 
[2.29] 
4.66 (55) 
[2.18] 
3.23 (32) 
[2.18] 
3.98 (25) 
[2.36] 
Value for keepers 4.60 (27) 
[2.46] 
4.69 (13) 
[2.09] 
– 4.50 (14) 
2.84 
Value for  
non-keepers 
3.48 (23) 
[1.55] 
3.62 (12) 
[1.72] 
– 3.32 (11) 
[1.42] 
Years experience 11.74 (112) 
[10.37] 
12.76 (55) 
[12.60] 
10.62 (32) 
[7.96] 
8.61 (41) 
[4.87] 
Dealer 0.10 (112) 
[0.30] 
0.16 (55) 
[0.37] 
0.00(32) 
[0.00] 
0.08 (25) 
[0.26] 
Gender 0.875 (112) 
[0.33] 
0.87 (55) 
[0.31] 
0.88 (32) 
[0.34] 
0.88 (25) 
[0.33] 
Age 38.58 (112) 
[13.52] 
39.6 (55) 
[14.79] 
36.75 (32) 
[12.61] 
38.68 (25) 
[11.89] 
Education 15.05 (112) 
[2.46] 
15.09 (55) 
[2.40] 
15.06 (32) 
[2.82] 
14.96 (25) 
[2.17] 
Keep 0.54 (50) 
[0.50] 
0.52 (25) 
[0.51] 
– 0.56 (25) 
[0.51] 
Delay difficultya 3.12 (41) 
[1.38] 
3.04 (24) 
[1.20] 
– 3.24 (17) 
[1.64] 
Delay difficulty for 
keepers 
2.88 (24) 
[1.42] 
2.92 (13) 
[1.32] 
– 2.82 (11) 
[1.60] 
Delay difficulty for 
non-keepers 
3.47 (17) 
[1.28] 
3.18 (11) 
[1.08] 
– 4.00(6) 
[1.55] 
Reversal difficulty 1.77 (89) 
[0.88] 
1.86 (43) 
[0.94] 
1.67 (21) 
[0.87] 
1.72 (25) 
[0.79] 
Reversal difficulty 
for keepers 
2.11 (27) 
[0.93] 
2.31 (13) 
[1.11] 
– 1.93 (14) 
[0.73] 
Reversal difficulty 
for non-keepers 
1.52(23) 
[0.73] 
1.58 (12) 
[0.67] 
– 1.45 (11) 
[0.82] 
     
Income 59,085 (112) 
[30,657] 
54,545 (55) 
[30,112] 
68,672 (32) 
[30,848] 
58,800 (25) 
[30.04] 
Market value 4.49 (112) 
[2.15] 
4.98 (55) 
[2.31] 
4.24 (32) 
[2.08] 
3.51 (25) 
[1.54] 
Note: The table presents the sample means of the variables, with the number of sample points in 
parentheses and the standard deviations in square brackets. 
a Delay difficulty and intent to keep was collected only for the “table treatment” subsample and correspond-
ing base subsample as explained in the text. 
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Hypothesis 1 
Using data from experiment I, we run a series of simple ordinary least squares (OLS) 
bid/offer regressions. Tables 3 and 4 present the estimation results for six specifications 
for WTP (WTA), where the dependent variables are the individual bids (offers). Specifi-
cations 1 and 2 estimate the effects of the difficulties of delaying and reversing the 
transaction on the WTP and WTA values; specifications 3 and 4 estimate the effects of 
being a keeper; and specifications 5 and 6 combine these models.6  
The regression results strongly support our theoretical predictions: reversal difficulty 
and delay difficulty are statistically significant at conventional levels, and their signs are 
consistent with predictions of the commitment cost theory for both WTP and WTA and 
consistent across the specifications. For example, reversal difficulty reduces WTP and 
increases WTA, while delay difficulty reduces WTA and increases WTP.  
In experiment II, as shown in Table 2, the mean reported WTA for those with GBG 
is $3.23, which is statistically different from WTA of the control group ($4.66). Since a 
GBG reduces the reversal difficulty, this result is consistent with Hypothesis 1. Results 
for the table treatment subsample are directionally consistent with Hypothesis 1, but the 
mean WTA of $3.98 is not significantly different from $3.23 at conventional levels.  
 
TABLE 3. Willingness-to-pay regressions: experiment I 
 Specifications 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 7.75** 
(3.27) 
8.39** 
(3.08) 
7.66** 
(9.56) 
7.69** 
(8.45) 
6.37* 
(1.92) 
6.12* 
(1.75) 
Reversal 
difficultya 
-1.82** 
(-2.75) 
-1.93** 
(-2.73) 
    
Delay  
difficultyb 
2.52** 
(2.76) 
2.42** 
(2.57) 
  1.90* 
(1.93) 
1.95* 
(1.92) 
Keep 
(=1 if keep) 
  -0.66 
(-0.46) 
-0.69 
(-0.45) 
0.56 
(0.38) 
0.68 
(0.44) 
Dealer 
(=1 if a dealer) 
 -0.97 
(-0.50) 
 -0.11 
(-0.06) 
 0.50 
(0.26) 
Gender 
(=1 if male) 
    -2.21 
(-0.87) 
-2.15 
(-0.84) 
       
R2 0.34 0.34 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.13 
N 34 34 49 49 49 49 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.   
a
 Response to question 10b.  
b
 Response to question 11a.  
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TABLE 4. Willingness-to-accept regressions: experiment I 
 Specifications 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 12.55** 
(3.24) 
14.10** 
(3.08) 
10.00** 
(6.93) 
9.85** 
(6.29) 
5.00 
(1.29) 
4.73 
(1.20) 
Reversal 
difficultya 
2.38 
(1.49) 
2.08 
(1.23) 
  4.40** 
(3.31) 
4.47** 
(3.33) 
Delay  
difficultyb 
-3.21** 
(-2.82) 
-3.61** 
(-2.76) 
    
Keep 
(=1 if keep) 
  5.39** 
(2.47) 
5.54** 
(2.43) 
5.47** 
(2.85) 
5.83** 
(2.92) 
Dealer 
(=1 if a dealer) 
 -2.26 
(-0.66) 
 1.15 
(0.26) 
 2.70 
(0.70) 
Gender 
(=1 if male) 
    -2.18 
(-0.73) 
-2.38 
(-0.79) 
       
R2 0.40 0.41 0.14 0.09 0.36 0.37 
N 23 23 41 41 41 41 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%. 
a Response to question 11a (note that this is different from the WTP table). 
b
 Response to question 10b. 
 
As in experiment I, we run a set of OLS regressions and report summary estimates in 
Table 5. Table 5 includes a series of specifications that generally provides insights 
consonant with Hypothesis 1. For example, in specification 1, while the table treatment 
dummy variable is not significant at conventional levels, the GBG dummy is highly 
significant and negative, consistent with Hypothesis 1. In addition, empirical results in 
columns 2 and 3 show that the coefficient of reversal difficulty is positive and highly 
significant. Specifications 4 and 5 provide insights on the robustness of the statistical 
significance of the treatment dummies with respect to the dealer and gender variables. In 
each case, the GBG dummy variable remains highly significant and negative. Specifica-
tions in columns 6–8 report regression results using models that include delay difficulty 
and whether subjects planned to keep the good.7 Neither the perceived delay difficulty 
nor the table treatment dummy is statistically significant at conventional levels. However, 
the perceived reversal difficulty is statistically significant, and its sign is consistent with 
Hypothesis 1.8 
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Hypothesis 2 
We return to the experiment I data to examine the WTP and WTA values for various 
combinations of the perceived delay/reversal difficulties. Table 6 groups the subjects into 
the three categories specified in Hypothesis 2. Data summarized in row 1 support Hy-
pothesis 2(i): the average WTA of 13.33 is larger than the average WTP of 5.84 for those 
who perceive a higher reversal difficulty than delay difficulty, and the difference is 
significant. Row 3 of Table 6 confirms Hypothesis 2(ii): WTP (13.93) > WTA (6.25) for 
the case of reversal difficulty being smaller than the delay difficulty. Again, the differ-
ence is statistically significant at conventional levels. We find this result to be quite 
amazing, as it suggests the strength of our dynamic option-based theory—aligning groups 
of subjects by the degree of delay/reversal difficulty yields average WTP values that are 
greater than average WTA values, precisely as the commitment cost theory predicts. 
Several pieces of evidence from Table 6 are relevant for Hypothesis 2(iii). First, for 
subjects who perceive a higher difficulty to sell than to buy in both WTP and WTA, 
average WTP (5.84) is not significantly different from the average WTA (6.25). For those 
perceiving a higher difficulty to buy, average WTP (13.93) is not statistically different 
from the average WTA (13.33). Both null results are consistent with Hypothesis 2(iii). 
Yet results summarized in row 2 of Table 6 do not confirm 2(iii): although our theory 
predicts WTP = WTA when the delay and reversal costs are equivalent, the data indicate 
WTA > WTP. This result is, however, consistent with Hanemann’s (1991) neoclassical 
explanation: because of income (shifts in the indifference curve) and substitution (curva-
ture of the indifference curves) effects, neoclassical theory predicts value divergences.  
 
TABLE 6. Effects of relative reversal and delay difficulties: experiment I 
WTP WTA 
Relative Difficulties Mean N Mean N 
1. Reversal difficulty > delay difficulty 5.84 
(3.11) 
19 13.33 
(5.47) 
6 
2. Reversal difficulty = delay difficulty 6.50 
(4.07) 
8 15.00 
(6.12) 
5 
3. Reversal difficulty < delay difficulty 13.93 
(5.42) 
7 6.25 
(3.05) 
12 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
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Table 7 makes a finer split of the data by comparing specific levels of reversal/delay 
difficulties. Each cell represents WTP and WTA values for subjects who perceived 
certain degrees of buying and selling difficulties. For Hypothesis 2(i), the relevant 
comparisons are the WTP values in cells below the diagonal and WTA values in cells 
above the diagonal. These are subjects who perceive a higher reversal difficulty than 
delay difficulty in both WTP and WTA transactions. In these data it is clear that WTA> 
WTP either in pair-wise comparisons or in aggregate, supporting Hypothesis 2(i).  
Similarly, Hypothesis 2(ii) is confirmed by a comparison of the WTP values in cells 
above the diagonal with WTA values in cells below the diagonal. Further, since the WTP 
and WTA values in the same cell are formed under beliefs about selling and buying diffi-
culties that are consistent across the WTP and WTA treatments, Hypothesis 2(iii) predicts 
that the two values should be equivalent in each cell. Among the eight cells for which both 
values are reported, the average WTP is similar to the average WTA in six cells (WTA is 
higher than WTP in the other two cells). This observation supports Hypothesis 2(iii).9 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The divergence of compensation demanded and WTP measures of value has 
prompted many economists to pause and contemplate whether the basic tenets of neoclas-
sical theory are satisfied. Some commentators have used the vast empirical evidence to 
 
TABLE 7. Perceptions of reversal/delay difficulties: experiment I 
Difficulty of buying later (DelayD for WTP, or RevD for WTA)  
1 2 3 4 5 
1 3.50 (2) 
13.33 (3) 
16 (3) 
13 (4) 
15 (1) 
14 (2) 
  
2 6.8 (5) 
7.4 (5) 
9.0 (5)  
17.5 (2) 
12.5 (2) 
– 
9.5 (1)  
– 
 
3 5.50 (6) 
4.25 (4) 
8.33 (3)  
9.00 (2) 
   
4 4 (2) 
– 
5 (1) 
3 (1) 
   
Difficulty of 
selling 
later  
(RevD for 
WTP, or 
DelayD for 
WTA) 
5  5 (1) 
– 
1 (1) 
– 
  
Note: The first entry is the average WTP, and the bottom entry is the average WTA; the sample size is in 
parentheses. 
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call into question the fundamental building blocks of economic theory. While static 
neoclassical theories have been proposed to explain the observed preferences, the data 
generally have not conformed well to these theories. In this paper, we examine whether a 
dynamic neoclassical theory based on the presence of commitment costs can explain the 
behavior of individuals within a competitive marketplace.  
We find several pieces of evidence that are in favor of the commitment cost theory. 
First, our field experiment results suggest that a value disparity exists, even for those 
consumers who plan to purchase the good for resale. Second, we find that the compara-
tive static predictions of the theory perform quite well: WTP (compensation demanded) 
increases (decreases) in the difficulty of delay and decreases (increases) in the difficulty 
of reversing the transaction. Third, even under the most stringent of our theoretical 
conjectures—including cases where WTP is predicted to exceed WTA—our data perform 
well. Overall, our results suggest that commitment costs are an important source of the 
value disparity and provide strong evidence that a neoclassical-based theory can explain 
the causes and severity of the value disparity. 
  
Endnotes 
1.  Hanemann’s (1991) work extended that of Randall and Stoll (1980), who demon-
strated that the WTP/WTA disparity depends on the “price flexibility of income.” 
Hanemann proved that the price flexibility of income is analytically equivalent to the 
ratio of the ordinary income elasticity of demand for the good to the Allen-Uzawa 
elasticity of substitution between the good and the numéraire. Thus, for low elastic-
ity of substitution values, the price flexibility of income is large, suggesting that the 
ratio WTP/WTA also is large.  
 
2.  This assumption can be relaxed without changing the key results of our model. If the 
uncertainty is only partially resolved, the magnitude of the commitment cost effect 
will be smaller than if the resolution is complete, but the qualitative results will re-
main unchanged. 
 
3.  We should also note that we randomized participants into one of the two treatments 
by changing the treatment type at the top of each hour. Also, subjects only partici-
pated in one treatment. 
 
4.  Unless otherwise noted, all claims are supported by statistical tests at the 5 percent 
level. For every unconditional comparison, we employ a two-sample t-test and a 
two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test.  
 
5.  Average values of the subject-specific characteristics are similar across the two 
subsamples, indicating that our experiment procedure was successful at random 
placement of subjects in the two treatments. 
 
6.  Since “keepers” only answered the question of purchasing the good in the future, 
only delay difficulty is included for WTP and only reversal difficulty is included for 
WTA in specifications 5 and 6. 
 
7.  The number of observations decreases considerably in these specifications because 
many subjects left responses to these questions blank. Also, the GBG treatment 
dummy is not identifiable since none of these subjects completed the “delay diffi-
culty” and “keep” questions because of experiment error. 
 
8.  Overall, in experiment II, the effects of the GBG and the perceived reversal difficulty 
provide perspicuous support for Hypothesis 1, but the table treatment and the per-
ceived delay difficulty variables are consistently insignificant. There are at least two 
possible explanations. One is that respondents did not view the offer to use the moni-
tor’s table the next week as a significant decrease in the cost of delaying their 
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transaction to notably lower their commitment costs (they would still have to take the 
time to come and use the table with an uncertain outcome). Alternatively, respondents 
may not have been considering the delay possibility when forming their WTA values.  
 
9.  Our theory also conveniently describes empirical results that suggest that market 
experience attenuates the value disparity (e.g., Knez, Smith, and Williams 1985; 
Coursey, Hovis, and Schulze 1987; Brookshire and Coursey 1987; List 2003). 
 
  
Appendix 
Survey Forms 
 
(I) WTP Treatment 
Confidential Survey 
These questions will be used for statistical purposes only. THIS INFORMATION WILL 
BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL AND WILL BE DESTROYED UPON COMPLETION 
OF THE STUDY. 
 
 1.  How long have you been active in the sportscard and memorabilia market? ______yrs 
 2.  Are you a sportscard or sports memorabilia professional dealer? ________ 
 3.  How many sportscard or memorabilia shows do you attend in a typical year? _______ 
 4.  In how many of those do you typically trade? ___________  
 5.  Gender:  1) Male      2) Female 
 6.  Age   ______            Date of Birth   ____________ 
 7.  What is the highest grade of education that you have completed. (Circle one)    
  1) Eighth grade   3) 2-Year College                  5) 4-Year College 
  2) High School   4) Other Post-High School    6) Graduate School Education 
 8.  What is your approximate yearly income from all sources, before taxes? 
  1) Less than $10,000        5) $40,000 to $49,999 
  2) $10,000 to $19,999      6) $50,000 to $74,999 
  3) $20,000 to $29,999      7) $75,000 to $99,999 
  4) $30,000 to $39,999      8) $100,000 or over 
 9.  What do you think is the likely market value of the good (a range is fine)?________ 
 10.  If you win the auction: 
 A. What do you plan to do with the good? Sell it ____ Trade it ____ Keep it _____ 
 B. If you plan to sell/trade the good, how easy do you think it will be to sell/trade? 
  1 (very easy) 2 3 4 5  (almost impossible) 
 C. If you decide to sell the good, which of the following do you think is true? You could 
  (a) Recoup the full bid_____ 
  (b) Take a loss ______ 
  (c) Earn a profit ______ 
 11. If you do not win the auction: 
 A. How easy do you think it will be to obtain the good (or a close substitute) later? 
  1 (very easy) 2 3 4 5 (almost impossible) 
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  B. If you were to purchase the good (or a close substitute) later, which of the following 
do you think is true? The purchase price would be 
  (a) Above my bid ______ 
  (b) Below my bid ______ 
  (c) About the same as my bid _____ 
 
 
 
(II) WTA Treatment 
Confidential Survey 
These questions will be used for statistical purposes only. THIS INFORMATION WILL 
BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL AND WILL BE DESTROYED UPON COMPLETION 
OF THE STUDY. 
 
 1.  How long have you been active in the sportscard and memorabilia market? ______yrs 
 2.  Are you a sportscard or sports memorabilia professional dealer? ________ 
 3.  How many sportscard or memorabilia shows do you attend in a typical year? _______ 
 4.  In how many of those do you typically trade? ___________  
 5.  Gender:  1) Male      2) Female 
 6.  Age   ______            Date of Birth   ____________ 
 7.  What is the highest grade of education that you have completed. (Circle one)    
  1) Eighth grade   3) 2-Year College                  5) 4-Year College 
  2) High School   4) Other Post-High School    6) Graduate School Education 
 8.  What is your approximate yearly income from all sources, before taxes? 
  1) Less than $10,000        5) $40,000 to $49,999 
  2) $10,000 to $19,999      6) $50,000 to $74,999 
  3) $20,000 to $29,999      7) $75,000 to $99,999 
  4) $30,000 to $39,999      8) $100,000 or over 
 9.  What do you think is the likely market value of the good (a range is fine)?________ 
 10.  If you do not sell in the auction: 
  A. What do you plan to do with the good? Sell it ____ Trade it ____ Keep it _____ 
  B. If you plan to sell/trade the good, how easy do you think it will be to sell/trade? 
  1 (very easy) 2 3 4 5  (almost impossible) 
 11.  If you do sell the good in the auction: 
  A. How easy do you think it will be to obtain the good (or a close substitute) later? 
  1 (very easy) 2 3 4 5 (almost impossible) 
  B. If you were to purchase the good (or a close substitute) later, which of the following 
do you think is true? The purchase price would be 
  Above my offer______ 
  Below my offer______ 
  About the same as my offer_____ 
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